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ROCHKIND V. STEVENSON: THE DAUBERT STANDARD WILL BE 
USED TO DETERMINE THE ADMISSION OF ALL EXPERT 
TESTIMONY, WHICH WILL ULTIMATELY CONTROL 
WHETHER THE TESTIMONY IS RELIABLE UNDER THE 
MARYLAND RULE 5-702 REQUIREMENT. 
 
By: Markisha Dobson 
 
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the Daubert standard will 
replace the Frye-Reed general acceptance test for the admission of all expert 
testimony.  Rochkind v. Stevenson, 471 Md. 1, 33-34, 236 A.3d 630, 649 
(2020).  The Daubert standard extends the analysis by considering additional 
factors to evaluate the testimony’s reliability.  Id. at 30, 236 A.3d at 647.  The 
following factors include whether a theory can be tested, has been reviewed 
by other peers, has a rate of error, has a set of standards, and whether a theory 
has been generally accepted.  Id. at 35, 236 A.3d at 650.  The court further 
elaborated that the Daubert test focuses on the reliability of the methods 
exhausted in order to reach a particular conclusion.  Id. at 31, 236 A.3d at 
648. 
     In 1991, Starlena Stevenson was only ten months old when she and her 
mother moved to a residence called Fairview, which is where they lived for 
over a year.  Stanley Rochkind was the owner of this residence.  Shortly after 
moving there, Ms. Stevenson’s mother discovered paint chipping throughout 
the house including the front porch, floors, and windowsills.  While still a 
resident at Fairview, Ms. Stevenson received blood lead tests and the levels 
were thirteen to fourteen micrograms per deciliter.  Two months after moving 
out of the residence, Ms. Stevenson’s levels decreased by two micrograms.  
Shortly after, Ms. Stevenson was diagnosed with Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and a variety of other disorders.    
     In December 2011, Ms. Stevenson filed a complaint against Mr. Rochkind 
in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, alleging negligence and several 
violations of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act.  The results of lead 
testing confirmed that over twenty interior surfaces and almost ten exterior 
surfaces of the Fairview residence contained lead.  Expert Dr. Cecilia 
Carrington (“Dr. Carrington”) concluded that there was a connection between 
Ms. Stevenson’s elevated lead levels and the lead presence at the Fairview 
residence.  
     After the trial court denied Mr. Rochkind’s four motions to exclude Dr. 
Carrington’s expert testimony, the jury returned a verdict awarding over $1.3 
million dollars in economic and noneconomic damages.  Mr. Rochkind 
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renewed the previous motions and requested to hold a Frye-Reed hearing, but 
all requests were denied.  The second trial dealt with the issue of damages 
and the jury returned a reduction of damages for $1.1 million dollars, which 
was due to a statutory cap.  Mr. Rochkind appealed but the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland held that Dr. Carrington’s testimony was properly 
added.  
     In Stevenson I, Mr. Rochkind’s first appeal was granted for the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland to determine the fate of Dr. Carrington’s testimony.   
Mr. Rochkind argued that Dr. Carrington’s testimony be excluded since the 
Frye-Reed and Maryland Rule 5-702 (“Rule 5-702”) requirements were not 
satisfied.  The court held that Dr. Carrington’s testimony failed to show that 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) supported the claim that lead 
exposure caused ADHD.  As a result, the court remanded the case back to the 
circuit court to assess the issue regarding damages.  
     The Circuit Court of Baltimore City declared a mistrial since Dr. 
Carrington mentioned in her testimony that lead exposure does cause ADHD, 
which was to be excluded per the Court of Appeals of Maryland.  Ultimately, 
in the fourth trial, Dr. Carrington properly testified without mentioning 
ADHD and the jury awarded Ms. Stevenson $3 million dollars in economic 
and non-economic damages.  Subsequently, Ms. Stevenson filed a petition 
for a writ of certiorari and Mr. Rochkind filed a cross petition, which were 
granted.   
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland sought to determine whether the court 
should use the Daubert standard for the admission of expert testimony, 
specifically Dr. Carrington’s testimony.  Rochkind, 471 Md. at 10, 236 A.3d 
at 635-36.  The court explained that the general acceptance analysis under the 
Frye-Reed test is no longer effective for a full assessment of reliability of 
expert testimony.  Id. at 31, 236 A.3d at 647-48. Courts have communicated 
that the Frye-Reed test is too restrictive and allows potentially unreliable 
methods to go unquestioned.  Id. at 32, 236 A.3d at 648-49. 
     Maryland courts have expressed that the Frye-Reed test has “drifted” in 
the direction of the Daubert analysis in two ways.  Rochkind, 471 Md. at 15, 
236 A.3d at 638-39.  First, the Frye-Reed test has been used to evaluate 
scientific conclusions, and second, the test has also been applied to novel and 
established scientific methods.  Id.  Courts have found that expert testimony 
is inadmissible if it is based on scientific methods without consideration on 
whether the analysis was flawed and included an “analytical gap.”  Id. at 19, 
236 A.3d at 640.  An analytical gap is present when the expert’s data and his 
or her conclusions fail to connect.  Id. at 18-19, 236 A.3d at 640.  Maryland 
courts agreed that expert testimony was subject to a Frye-Reed hearing and 
was found inadmissible when it offered novel scientific techniques that were 
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directly controversial or viewed as a technique that was experimental.  Id. at 
19, 236 A.3d at 641.   
     Maryland Rule 5-702 provides additional requirements to the Frye-Reed 
analysis because the general acceptance test does not fully determine the 
admissibility of expert testimony.  Rochkind, 471 Md. at 23, 236 A.3d at 643.  
In Stevenson I, the Court of Appeals of Maryland concluded that the 
“sufficient factual basis element” under the Rule 5-702 requirement, was not 
satisfied, which led to inadmissible testimony.  Id. at 22, 236 A.3d at 642.  
The EPA could not support Dr. Carrington’s testimony because the studies 
only stated that there was “an association between lead exposure and 
ADHD.”   Id. at 25, 236 A.3d at 644.  Therefore, she failed to provide a factual 
basis for causation.  Id.  
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland has adopted the Daubert standard to 
replace the Frye-Reed test to effectively evaluate all expert testimony.  
Rochkind, 471 Md. at 26, 236 A.3d at 645.  For Ms. Stevenson’s case, the 
Daubert standard will be applied since the circuit court failed to hold a Rule 
5-702 pretrial hearing.  Id. at 25-26, 236. A.3d at 645.  Dr. Carrington could 
have provided clarity to the scientific methodology regarding the causation 
between Ms. Stevenson’s ADHD and her lead exposure at the Fairview 
residence.  Id.   
     The dissent argued that adopting the Daubert standard is not necessary, 
given this case’s procedural history.  Rochkind, 471 Md. at 47, 236 A.3d at 
657.  The dissent included that the majority should not make a decision on a 
matter that is not at issue in the circuit court.  Id. at 53, 236 A.3d at 660-61.  
It also asserted that the majority failed to observe the impact that this 
analytical change would have on litigants of various financial backgrounds, 
particularly people of color.  Id. at 54, 236 A.3d at 661. The dissent concluded 
that the Daubert standard has caused less claims to be filed because of many 
plaintiffs’ inability to present efficient expert testimony. Id.  
     Here, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the Daubert standard 
will be the prevailing standard because of its considerations in determining 
the admissibility of expert testimony.  This court prefers the Daubert standard 
over the Frye-Reed analysis because it considers the requirements under Rule 
5-702 as well.  Plaintiffs may struggle to get their expert’s testimony admitted 
due to a higher level of judicial discretion.  Though the dissent believes the 
majority’s approach is premature and lacks sufficient research, plaintiffs are 
strongly encouraged to seek the best experts for their trials.  Practitioners are 
also put on notice to ensure that their experts provide efficient and accurate 
testimony for admissibility in order to adhere to this new standard. 
